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LATOUR REY LAFFERTY*

I.

INTRODUCTION

GIANT LEAP - DEAL SET TO BRING GIANTS TO DOME.
This St. Petersburg Times headline was supposed to mark a historic achievement for Florida baseball fans. Instead, Tampa Bay's fifteen year struggle to acquire a major league professional baseball
team turned into an apparition. The date was August 8, 1992, and a
Tampa Bay investment group had just announced an "agreement in
principle" with San Francisco Giants owner Bob Lurie to purchase
the Giants and move the team to the Florida Suncoast Dome, now
known as the Thunderdome, in St. Petersburg. The obstacle: approval
of the sale by Major League Baseball (MLB).1
The events subsequent to this announcement are no secret to any
average sports fan. On November 10, 1992, the National League
voted 9 to 4 to keep the Giants in San Francisco, 2 and thus, MLB
declined approval of the sale and relocation. The proffered reason for
the vote of disapproval was a "general reluctance" to relocate baseball teams.' Philadelphia Phillies owner Bill Giles, a Tampa Bay supporter and one of the National League owners who participated in the
secret ballot, stated that there is a "very large sentiment to not moving franchises if a good citizen group steps to the table with the money

A
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1. The sale and relocation required approval by a majority of American League owners (8
of 14) and three-fourths of National League owners (10 of 14), and Fay Vincent, the Commissioner of Major League Baseball. See Alan Truex, Playoff Expansion Favored; Poll: Owners
also want Realignment, Interleague Play, THE Hous. CHRON., Mar. 5, 1993, at Sports 1.
2. Murray Chass, Look What Wind Blew Back: Baseball's Giants, N.Y. Tidars, Nov. 11,

1992, at BII.
3. Marc Topkin,Filling Loopholes Sealed Deal for S.F., ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs,
1992, at IA,6A.

Nov. 12,
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[to keep the team in San Francisco]." 4 National League President Bill
White characterized MLB's decision-making process as being fair.'
Was the process that denied Tampa Bay's effort to purchase the
Giants really fair? The "agreement in principle" between the Tampa
investment group and Bob Lurie contained a provision precluding Lurie from considering or accepting any other offers for the Giants
pending MLB's review of the Tampa Bay offer.6 Yet on September 4,
1992, the same day the Tampa Bay group submitted its application to
MLB for approval, the chairman of MLB's Ownership Committee,
Ed Kuhlman, directed Lurie to consider other offers in addition to
Tampa Bay's offer. On September 9, 1992, Bill White invited George
Shinn, a North Carolina businessman, to make a competing offer for
the Giants.7 Both of these acts violated Lurie's exclusive agreement
with Tampa Bay.'
If these public actions are insufficient to raise doubts as to the fairness of MLB's decision-making process, the behind-the- scenes actions
of Los Angeles Dodgers owner Peter O'Malley and Florida Marlins
owner Wayne Huizenga may. O'Malley, who publicly opposed the
sale and relocation of the Giants, actively lobbied votes against the
deal "in the best interests of baseball." 9 O'Malley's best interest was
the continuing regional rivalry between the Dodgers and Giants. Ironically, it was O'Malley's father who, in the best interests of the Dodgers, moved the team from Brooklyn to Los Angeles. Huizenga, on the
other hand, publicly supported the sale and relocation of the Giants,
but allegedly worked deviously for months to prevent approval. 0 Huizenga, of course, was awarded the Florida Marlins expansion team
over Tampa Bay in 1991. Notably, the chairman of the Expansion
Committee in charge of selecting the expansion cities in 1991 was Ed
Kuhlman.
Although Tampa Bay residents may dispute White's characterization of the decision-making process as fair, the critical issue is whether
it was legal. MLB's blatant indifference to the terms of Tampa Bay's
agreement with Lurie raises the issue of potential antitrust violations
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 422 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
7. Id. at 423.
8. Ed Kuhlman also publicly questioned the personal backgrounds of several Tampa Bay
investors. Id. at 422-23. Kuhlman's concern apparently involved their financial capability and
"something" that had shown up on a security check of the "Pennsylvania People." Id. On
September 12, 1992, Kuhlman admitted that "there was no problem with the security check."
Id.
9. Nice Guys Finish Last, ST. PETERSBURO TimEs, Nov. I1, 1992, at 18A.
10. Id.
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and MLB's unique antitrust exemption. Vincent M. Piazza, a member
of the Tampa Bay investment group, has since filed suit against MLB,
charging it with antitrust violations. Piazza's suit alleges MLB monopolizes the market for professional baseball and places both direct
and indirect restraints on the purchase, sale, transfer, relocation of,
and competition for, professional baseball teams." Piazza, in his attempt to hold MLB responsible for its alleged illegal actions, has thus
challenged the continuing vitality of the MLB antitrust exemption.
This Article questions the prudence of the Major League Baseball
antitrust exemption and argues that the exemption should be limited
to antitrust violations involving the labor market in the context of
player restraint. First, the Article briefly summarizes federal antitrust
laws and then delineates the United States Supreme Court's trilogy of
decisions granting and upholding the unique antitrust exemption afforded Major League Baseball. Second, the Article identifies the impact collective bargaining and the labor law antitrust exemption has
on the utility of this exemption in modern labor disputes. Third, the
Article analyzes the United States District Court's decision in Piazza
v. Major League Baseball and argues that the antitrust exemption
should not be applicable to potential product market violations as in
Piazza. Although the Article reaches a conclusion on the sensible applicability of the antitrust exemption, it leaves to sports fans the debate of the fairness of MLB's actions in denying Tampa Bay's
continuing effort to acquire a professional baseball team.
II.

THE MLB ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
A.

The Sherman Antitrust Act

Federal antitrust laws are intended to encourage free trade by preventing anti-competitive behavior involving interstate commerce. 2
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 189013 contains two provisions that restrict the regulatory authority of MLB. These provisions are generally
referred to as Sherman I14 and Sherman II,11 and both further the leg-

11. Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 424.
12. GEORGE W. SCHUBERT ET AL., SPORTs LAW §3.2 (1986) [hereinafter SPORTS LAW].
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
14. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." Id. at §1.
15. "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony ..... Id. at §2.
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islative intent of promoting a business environment with unrestricted
competition. 6 Sherman I deems illegal conspiracies to contract that
unreasonably restrain trade in interstate commerce. However, not all
contracts that restrain interstate commerce are illegal; only contracts
that are found to be unreasonable violate Sherman I. 17 Sherman II, on
the other hand, prohibits conduct that monopolizes interstate commerce. It is directed against monopoly power, or the power to exclude
competition, and is measured by the market share the monopolizer
controls in a particular area of interstate commerce.m8
Both antitrust provisions can regulate professional sports. However, the conspiracy requirement of Sherman I makes Sherman 11 the
more applicable provision in disputes between owners and players involving the labor market in the player restraint context. Essentially,
Sherman II proscribes a monopolist's predatory conduct that is intended to maintain market position.19 This may involve any action by
a monopolist to maintain or expand its market share against challenges from a new entrant into that market.20 Thus, the monopoly
maintained by regulatory entities over professional sports makes Sherman II restrictions a prime basis for litigation." Any attempt by the
regulatory entity to restrict the entry of a new participant into the regulated sport's product market (i.e., the professional baseball market)
raises Sherman II antitrust concerns.
B.

The Supreme Court Trilogy

The origin and continuing vitality of MLB's antitrust exemption,
which began more than seventy years ago, was established through a
trilogy of Supreme Court decisions. Unlike other professional sport
regulatory entities 2 2 MLB has enjoyed an antitrust exemption since
1922. The business of baseball was exempted from the Sherman Antitrust Act in the landmark decision Federal Baseball Club of Balti-

supra note 12, at §3.2.

16.

SPORTS LAW,

17.

Id.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Other professional sports have been held subject to the Sherman Antitrust Act. See,

Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (Football); United States v. Int'l. Boxing Club of New York, Inc., 348 U.S. 236 (1955) (Boxing); Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. United
States Tennis Ass'n., 665 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1981) (Tennis); Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf
Ass'n., 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D.Ga. 1973) (Golf); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v.
Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D.Pa. 1972) (Hockey); Washington Professional Basketball Corp. v. Nat'l Basketball Association, 147 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)
(Basketball).
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more, Inc. v. NationalLeague of ProfessionalBaseball Clubs,23 when
the Supreme Court held that the business of baseball did not constitute interstate commerce.
The Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. (the "Baltimore
Club") was formed in 1913 for the purpose of hosting baseball exhibitions.24 The Baltimore Club was one member of the rival Federal
League of Professional Baseball Clubs ("Federal League"), an administrative entity formed in 1913 for the purpose of providing baseball games during World War 1.21 In 1915, the Federal League, the
National League, and the American League of Professional Baseball
Clubs entered into an agreement whereby the Federal League and all
its constituent clubs, except the Baltimore Club, would dissolve. 26
In Federal Baseball Club, the Baltimore Club alleged that the National League conspired to monopolize the business of baseball by
controlling the labor market for baseball players.1 The Federal
League claimed that due to the National League's monopoly, it was
unable to provide baseball exhibitions to the public. 2 It was alleged
that the National League controlled the labor market through the use
of a reserve clause in player contracts that required each player to remain with its respective club after the season or be treated as ineligible
for league play until the player had been formally reinstated by the
National League.29 Through this reserve clause, the National League
allegedly controlled the market for baseball players and thus illegally
monopolized interstate commerce.
The jury returned a verdict for the Baltimore Club,30 but the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case
with instructions to enter judgment for the National League.3 The
court of appeals said that the movement of baseball players and their
equipment between each city and state, not the business of baseball
itself, was interstate commerce.3 2 The court found that the game of
23. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
24. Nat'l League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore,
Inc., 269 F. 681, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1920) aff'd, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
25. Id. In addition to Baltimore, other cities such as Brooklyn, Pittsburgh, Buffalo, St.
Louis, Kansas City, Indianapolis and Chicago formed clubs that were issued a franchise by the
Federal League. Id. See generally THE BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA (Joseph L. Reichler ed., 1985);
LAWRENCE S. RrrrE , TiE GLORY OF THEIR TtMES (1966); 1 & 2 HAROLD SEYMOUR, BASEBALL
(1990); 1 & 2 DAVID VOIGT, AMERJCAN BASEBALL (1966).

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

269 F. at 682.
Id. at 683.
Id.
Id. at 684.
Id. at 682.
Id. at 688.
Id. at 685.
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baseball itself is not susceptible to being transferred from state to
was merely incistate. 3 Thus, baseball's effect on interstate commerce
34
dent to the game and not an antitrust violation.
This decision was subsequently affirmed by the United States Supreme Court," where Justice Holmes agreed with the court of appeals
that the business of professional baseball was a state affair and that
the reserve clause did not affect interstate commerce. 6 Thus, by narrowly defining interstate commerce to include the transportation of
players and equipment, but not the game of baseball with its player
contract reserve clause, the Supreme Court created the MLB antitrust
exemption. The exemption was premised upon the finding that baseball was not interstate commerce.
Over the years, the Supreme Court has twice revisited the issue of
MLB's antitrust exemption, both times upholding the exemption
based on precedent and leaving any abrogation to Congress. In Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc. ,7 the Supreme Court upheld the exemption with the understanding that the exemption's abrogation
should be left to legislation.3" Justice Burton wrote in dissent that the
nature of the game, with its distinct place in American tradition, justified the Court's reliance on legislative abrogation. 9 However, Justice
Burton noted that the responsibility of recanting the exemption is a
judicial responsibility, due to Congress's apparent unwillingness to
overrule the exemption ° Indeed, Justice Burton characterized baseball as a "highly organized" sport that "amount[s] to an interstate
monopoly.'4'

33.

Id.

34. Id. The court of appeals held that the antitrust statute does not apply when the effect
on interstate commerce is indirect rather than direct. Id. at 686-87. The court stated that if the
necessary effect on interstate commerce is to incidentally or indirectly restrict commerce, while
its primary effect is to promote the trade or increase the business of baseball, it does not violate
the law. Id. at 687.
35. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. Nat'l League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
36. Id. at 209.
37. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
38. The Supreme Court stated that "[wie think that if there are evils in this field [baseball]
which now warrant application to it of the antitrust laws it should be by legislation." Id. at 357.
39. Justice Burton wrote:
Conceding the major asset which baseball is to our Nation, the high place it enjoys in
the hearts of our people and the possible justification of special treatment for organized sports which are engaged in interstate trade or commerce, the authorization of
such treatment is a matter within the discretion of Congress.
Id. at 364.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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The Supreme Court's reluctance to abrogate the exemption in Toolson appears to have been founded upon two concerns: first, Congress's refusal to act, and second, the retroactive effect of its decision.
The Court framed the issue as whether to overrule Federal Baseball
and apply Federal antitrust laws retrospectively. 42 In upholding Federal Baseball, the Court noted that Congress had considered the issue
and chose not to subject baseball to antitrust laws through legislation
"having prospective effect." 43 Thus, the Supreme Court decided that
the issue was a legislative concern rather than a judicial one.
The MLB antitrust exemption remained unscathed for another
twenty years until the Supreme Court arguably limited the precedential effect of FederalBaseball, and the antitrust exemption, to MLB's
reserve clause. In Flood v. Kuhn," a disgruntled player challenged the
reserve clause under federal antitrust laws after he was traded in 1969
from the St. Louis Cardinals to the Philadelphia Phillies. 41 Unhappy
about the Cardinals' failure to consult him regarding the trade and the
fact that the reserve clause precluded him from playing baseball for
the team of his choice in 1970, Flood filed suit and sat out the 1970
season." The Supreme Court once again upheld Federal Baseball, citing the longstanding, albeit inconsistent and illogical, status of the exemption. 47 Further, the Supreme Court reiterated its concerns
expressed in Toolson regarding congressional inactivity and the retrospective application of its decisions."
Although it upheld FederalBaseball, the Supreme Court made several determinations that significantly undermine its rationale. The
Court first analyzed the legal background of the exemption and its
effect on professional sports other than baseball. 49 This background
provides rare insight into the policy reasons that may have supported
the Court's decision in 1922. Noting the special place professional
baseball has in the hearts of Americans, 0 the Court's analysis deline-

42. Id.at 357.
43. Id.
44. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
45. Flood's request that he be made a free agent permitting him to strike a deal with any
other club was denied by the Commissioner of Baseball. Id. at 265.
46. Id. at 266. After the 1970 season, Philadelphia "sold its rights to Flood to the Washington Senators." Flood played briefly for the Senators in 1971, but quit due to disappointment
with his performance; he never played professional baseball again. Id. at 266.
47. Id. at 282.
48. Id. at 283-84. The Court stated that at least there is a level of consistency in upholding
Federal Baseball, "even though some might claim that beneath that consistency is a layer of
inconsistency." Id. at 284.
49. See Id. at 276-81.
50. The Court quoted the District Court's Opinion below as stating:
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ates the belief that the "protective canopy" spread over baseball and
its reserve clause is "[wihat really saved baseball, legally at
least. . . ."' The Court's analysis went on to note that, "[T]he overwhelming preponderance of the evidence established baseball's need

for some sort of reserve clause. Baseball's history shows that chaotic
conditions prevailed when there was no reserve clause. Experience
points to no feasible substitute to protect the integrity of the game or

to guarantee a comparatively even competitive struggle.

'52

With this unique policy insight in perspective, the Court outlined its
subsequent refusal to expand the antitrust exemption to other professional sports." The Court rationalized its decisions as a "narrow application of the rule of stare decisis.' '4 The issue, the Court stated, is
not whether baseball's antitrust exemption should be expanded, but
whether a new exemption should be granted."
Accordingly, after rationalizing the exemption and its limitation to
professional baseball, the Court made several findings potentially undercutting FederalBaseball's precedential value. The Court first concluded, in stark contrast to Justice Holmes' opinion in 1922, that
56
professional baseball is a business engaged in interstate commerce.
However, the Court went on to find that the advent of radio and television, with their corresponding increased coverage and revenues, still
did not compel overruling Federal Baseball.5" In addition, the Court
found that MLB's unique antitrust exemption is limited to baseball
and that Congress's silence on the matter may be deemed as passive
approval.5 Finally, in reiterating its concern about retroactivity prob-

Baseball has been the national pastime for over one hundred years and enjoys a
unique place in our American heritage....
Baseball's status in the life of the nation is so pervasive that it would not strain
redulity to say the Court can take judicial notice that baseball is everybody's business.
Id. at 266 (quoting Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)).
51. Id. at 270 n.10 (quoting 2 HAROLD SEYMOUR, BASEaALL 420 (1971)).
52. Id. at 272-73 (quoting the HousE COmm. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT OF TIE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ST DY OF MONOPOLY POWER, H.R. Doc. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952)).
53. Id. at 276-80. See also Haywood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971); Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); United States v. Internat'l Boxing Club of
New York, 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
54. 407 U.S. at 276 (quoting United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 228-230 (1955), where
the Court stated that "Toolson was a narrow application of the rule of stare decisis").
55. Id. at 276-77 (quoting United States v. Internat'l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 243
(1955)).
56. Id. at 282. However, it must be noted that although Justice Holmes held that the business of baseball was not interstate commerce, he did not rule out its potential to develop into
interstate commerce. Toolson, 346 U.S. 356, 361 (1953) (citing Hart v. B.F. Keith Vaudeville
Exchange, 262 U.S. 271, 274 (1923)).
57. Flood, 407 U.S. at 283.
58. Id. at 283-84.
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lems, the Court stated that if FederalBaseball were to be overturned,
it would be by legislative action 5 9
It is fair to assume that the MLB antitrust exemption was created in
1922 to protect a vital part of American heritage. Professional baseball's reserve clause was seen as a method of ensuring continuity and
competition among baseball teams. Needless to say, the fact that individual players lost the ability of free choice was a small sacrifice for
American heritage in 1922. Over the years, the Supreme Court has
upheld this unique exemption in the name of precedent and the purported belief that if Congress wanted it changed, Congress would legislate it away. In sum, the distinct place professional baseball has in
the hearts of Americans is accompanied by a distinct legal anomaly
that purportedly once saved the day.
C.

Collective Bargainingand the Reserve Clause

So what exactly is the reserve clause and why did the Supreme
Court feel compelled to exempt it from federal antitrust law in 1922?
The reserve clause originated in 1879 as a result of talented players
frequently leaving teams and fueling higher salary demands. 60 Faced
with the threat of huge economic losses, the club owners created a
reserve clause that gave each club exclusive rights to their players'
services for succeeding seasons. 6' It was believed by many, especially
club owners, that this reserve clause would put an end to the spiraling
salary demands that threatened professional baseball in the 1870s.62
Since 1879, players' associations and collective bargaining agreements have impacted the reserve clause, making federal labor law a
relevant issue when addressing potential antitrust violations. Throughout the nineteenth century, labor unions were considered unlawful
conspiracies in restraint of trade. 63 Unions and collective bargaining
59. Id. at 284.
60. SPORTS LAW, supra note 12, at §6.1.
61. Id. The standard reserve clause that appeared in professional baseball contracts in the
early 1970s provides in pertinent part, "The Player agrees that, while under contract, and prior
to expiration of the Club's right to renew this contract, he will not play baseball otherwise than
for the Club, except that the Player may participate in post-season games under the conditions
prescribed in the Major League Rules." See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258,260 n.1 (1972).
62. SPORTS LAW, supra note 12, at §6.1. It appears the Supreme Court shared this belief
with the club owners when it exempted the reserve clause from federal antitrust law in Federal
Baseball. Note, however, that while reserve clauses effectively prohibit players from negotiating
contracts with other teams, they do not prevent players from negotiating contracts with the
teams of other professional leagues. Hence, professional sports have been challenged by upstart
leagues competing for the star player's services. Id. at §5. IA.
63. ROBERT A. GoRmAt, BAsIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARoAINIrG 621 (1976) [hereinafter LABOR LAW].
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were believed to be the source of the general increase in the price of
labor,6 presumably including the increased salary demands in professional baseball. When the Sherman Antitrust Act was enacted in 1890,
a provision excluding labor unions from its scope was eliminated during committee debate.65 Consequently, labor unions were liable for antitrust violations. 66
However, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)67 in 1935 to encourage collective bargaining. 8 The NLRA authorizes collective bargaining and mandates that labor and management bargain with one another in good faith over wages, hours, or
other terms or conditions of employment. 69 Thus, the NLRA exempts
certain labor matters agreed upon through collective bargaining from
federal antitrust laws.70 Nonetheless, the NLRA is applied to an industry and the activities of that industry must be engaged in interstate
71
commerce.
Prior to 1935, professional baseball players made several unsuccessful attempts to challenge baseball's reserve clause. After the Supreme
Court's decision in FederalBaseball, however, unionization and negotiation remained the sole method of protest. 2 Although the right of
professional baseball players to organize and bargain collectively was
established with the enactment of the NLRA in 1935, early attempts at
forming a players' association were unsuccessful. 73 Through the efforts of the American Baseball Guild, created in 1946, players futilely
attempted to supersede Federal Baseball by having baseball declared
to be interstate commerce.7 4 Finally, the Major League Baseball Play-

64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id.
Id. In 1914 Congress enacted the Clayton Act, seemingly in order to provide a labor

exemption to antitrust laws. See 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988). However, the Clayton Act was subse-

quently found not to be a labor exemption. LABOR LAW, supra note 63, at 622. See Gary R.
Roberts, Reconciling Federal Labor and Antitrust Policy: The Special Case of Sports League
Labor Market Restraints, 75 GEo. L.J. 19 (1986) for the argument that the Clayton Act should
exempt league restraints on the labor market from federal antitrust laws.
67. The NLRA was first enacted as the Wagner Act and is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1988).
68. LABoR LAW, supranote 63, at 543.
69. 29 U.S.C. §158(d) (1988).
70. It has also been argued that section six of the Clayton Act authorizes an exemption
from antitrust law for product labor restraints. See Gary R. Roberts, Reconciling FederalLabor
and Antitrust Policy: The Special Case of Sports League Labor Market Restraints, 75 GEo. L.J.
19(1986).
71.

SPORTs LAw, supra note 12, at §6.3A.

72.
73.
74.

Id. at § 6.1.
Id.
Id.
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ers Association (MLBPA) was formed in 1953 and continues to repre7
sent professional baseball players today. 1
Through collective bargaining, the MLBPA achieved some success
in challenging baseball's reserve clause. In 1976, the MLBPA successfully challenged the clause in arbitration and won the right for players
to become free agents after six years with their respective teams. 76 Although the reserve clause was not eradicated, this reserve system and
the extent of player free agency has been a component of the collec7
tive bargaining agreement ever since. 7
Similar to baseball, players associations formed in other sports as
well. 7 These players associations derived their strength from the ability to utilize both antitrust laws and collective bargaining to gain concessions from owners. 79 However, baseball remains distinct from other
sports due to the continuing vitality of its unique antitrust exemption.
In professional baseball, collective bargaining is the sole method for
professional baseball players to resolve labor disputes.
The limited success the MLBPA has achieved in challenging professional baseball's reserve system is in part due to the labor exemption
provided to collective bargaining. The antitrust labor exemption was
first recognized in the player restraint context in Mackey v. National
Football League.8 0 In Mackey, a player challenged the National Football League's reserve system, or "the Rozelle Rule." 8 1 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the applicability of the labor
exemption to player restraint cases, but held it to be inapplicable in
Mackey.82 The court limited the labor exemption's applicability to
cases where: (1) the restraint primarily affects only the parties to the
collective bargaining agreement; (2) the matter sought to be exempted
concerns a mandatory subject of collective bargaining; 3 and (3) the
agreement is the product of bona fide arm's-length bargaining."
75. Id.
76. Id. at §6.2.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D.Minn. 1975), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. withdrawn by agreement anddismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
81. 407 F. Supp. at 1002-03.
82. 543 F.2dat 623.
83. The National Labor Relations Act divides the subject matter of collective bargaining
agreements into two categories: mandatory and permissive. Mandatory matters include all subjects related to "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment," while permissive
matters are ones that arise outside the scope of mandatory subject matter. The relevance of the
distinction is that mandatory matters must be bargained for in good faith while there is no mandate that permissive matters be part of the collective bargaining agreement. SPORTs LAW, supra
note 12, at §6.3b.
84. 543 F.2d at 614.
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Labor law's exemption from federal antitrust laws is premised on
the preeminence of labor law policy favoring collective bargaining as
opposed to the free competition interests of antitrust law.' 5 The
Mackey court's limitation of the exemption may be attributed to the
court's belief that, since labor law policy is not sufficiently involved in
this situation, it does not deserve preeminence over antitrust laws unless certain conditions are met.86 In Mackey, the court held that the
exemption did not apply because the "Rozelle Rule" was not the
product of a bona fide arm's-length collective bargaining agreement. 87
However, Mackey served as precedent for other courts to approve of
the exemption in subsequent player restraint cases.8"
As previously discussed, under the Supreme Court trilogy, MLB has
enjoyed exemption from federal antitrust law for over seventy years. 9
As a result, the MLBPA is significantly weaker than other professional sports' players associations because of its inability to challenge
baseball's labor practices under federal antitrust laws. Thus, unlike
other professional sports, collective bargaining remains the MLBPA's
only means of redressing player grievances.
Accordingly, collective bargaining agreements between players associations and club owners dealing specifically with player movement
and free agency have potentially eradicated the need for MLB's antitrust exemption. The underlying policy rationale of FederalBaseball
no longer applies to professional baseball. Player challenges to the reserve clause, traditionally defended on grounds of the antitrust exemption, are now deferred to as a result of collective bargaining
agreements and the concession of free agency.
D.

The PrecedentialEffect of FederalBaseball

Since the Supreme Court's decision in Flood v. Kuhn, 90 the precedential effect of Federal Baseball beyond its specific application to
professional baseball's reserve clause has been called into question.
FederalBaseball and MLB's antitrust exemption were premised on the
Supreme Court's finding in 1922 that baseball did not constitute inter-

85.

SPORTS LAW, supra note 12, at §6.3(i).

86. 543 F.2d at 614.
87. Id. at 616. The court also held that matters such as the league's reserve system are a
condition of employment and thus a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. Id. at 615.
88. See, e.g., McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979) (exempting the
Nat'l Hfockey League's reserve system from federal antitrust laws under the league's collective
bargaining agreement).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 22-56.
90. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
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state commerce. 9' The Supreme Court reversed itself in Flood, where
it declared that baseball was indeed interstate commerce.9 2 However,
although the Court's rationale underlying FederalBaseball no longer
existed, the Supreme Court did not abrogate the exemption. 3 Instead,
the Supreme Court arguably attempted to limit the exemption's applicability to the reserve clause.
The importance of ascertaining the extent of the exemption concerns the scope of potential labor violations of the antitrust laws. Provided the labor matter is not part of a collective bargaining agreement
enjoying the labor exemption, antitrust disputes may arise in two contexts. First, the dispute may concern the labor market, such as in the
reserve clause and player restraint context, where owners try to monopolize the market for baseball players. Second, the dispute may involve the product market or the market for professional baseball as a
commodity. Arguably, the Court in Flood attempted to limit MLB's
exemption to the reserve clause and labor market context.
There is no question, that MLB's antitrust exemption extends only
to matters that are central to the business of baseball. 94 But, the pertinent issue after Flood is whether the exemption applies to the game in
general, or whether it is limited to disputes between players and owners in the player restraint context and the labor market. The only case
to consider this issue is Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn. 91 In Charles
0. Finley & Co., the corporate owner of the Oakland Athletics
charged MLB with antitrust violations for the league's failure to approve the sale and assignment of three player contracts to other
teams.9 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the antitrust violation claim on the basis of the
MLB antitrust exemption. 97 On appeal, the plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Flood limited the antitrust
91. See supratext accompanying note 22.
92. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 42-56.
94. Postema v. Nat'l League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 799 F. Supp. 1475, 1489
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (while baseball exemption immunizes baseball from antitrust challenges to its
league structure and its reserve system, it does not provide baseball with blanket immunity for
anti-competitive behavior in every context in which it operates, including baseball's employment
relationship with its umpires); Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n, Inc.,
541 F. Supp. 263, 271 (S.D.Tex. 1982) (holding that exemption does not extend to cover broadcasting of baseball games).
95. 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978).
96. Id. at 531. This dispute arose out of the Oakland Athletics' attempt to sell its rights to
Joe Rudi, Rollie Fingers and Vida Blue to the Boston Red Sox and the New York Yankees.
Kuhn, the Commissioner of Major League Baseball, disapproved the sale "as inconsistent with
the best interests of baseball ....
Id.
97. Id. at 544.
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exemption to the reserve clause. 98 The Seventh Circuit disagreed finding that a reading of the Supreme Court trilogy illustrates the Supreme Court's intent "to exempt the business of baseball, not any
particular facet of that business, from the federal antitrust laws." 99
The importance of determining the exemption's scope is magnified
by the differing contexts in which antitrust violations may arise. The
player mobility restraint cases involving baseball's reserve clause arise
in the labor market context of baseball's monopoly on players' services. There is no dispute that in this situation, MLB is exempt from
federal antitrust laws. Potential antitrust violations may also arise,
however, in the context of baseball's monopoly on the market for
professional baseball, the product market. The issue after Flood is
whether MLB should be exempt from federal antitrust laws here as
well.
III.

THE PiAzzA DECISION

The Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania was the first federal
court to specifically limit MLB's antitrust exemption to professional
baseball's reserve clause. In Piazza v. Major League Baseball, a group
of Tampa Bay investors filed suit against MLB for Sherman I and II
antitrust violations arising out of MLB's disapproval of their contract
to purchase and relocate the San Francisco Giants.10 The Tampa Bay
investors alleged that MLB conspired to eliminate all market competition, to exclude their participation in the relevant market, to establish
a monopoly over the relevant market, and to unreasonably restrain
trade by denying the sale, transfer, and relocation of the Giants to the
Tampa Bay area.' 0' In a motion to dismiss, MLB raised the antitrust
exemption granted in Federal Baseball as a defense to the investors'
cause of action.' 0 2 The district court, holding that the exemption is
limited to the reserve clause, denied MLB's motion.0 3
The district court's decision on the exemption issue in Piazza essentially consists of three parts. First, the court analyzed the development
4
of the MLB antitrust exemption and the Supreme Court trilogy.1
Second, the court analyzed the Supreme Court's decision in Flood and
concluded that the application of stare decisis limits the exemption to

98. Id. at 540.
99. Id. at 541.
100.

831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993).

101. Id. at424.
102. Id. at 429.
103. Id. at 438. The Piazza court subsequently denied MLB's attempt to appeal itsdecision
and set the case for trial in July 1994.
104. Id. at 433-35.
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the reserve clause. 05 Finally, the court distinguished its analysis from
the Seventh Circuit's Charles 0. Finley & Co. decision, which holds
that the exemption was not limited to the reserve clause. 16 Based on
this framework, Piazza essentially eradicated the modern utility of the
MLB antitrust exemption.
In reading Piazza and understanding its impact on the continuing
vitality of the MLB antitrust exemption, it is of paramount importance to first define the relevant market involved. In contrast to player
restraint cases, which involve the labor market where the exemption is
most applicable, the relevant market in Piazza is the product market,
or the market for professional baseball teams. The court defined this
market as the market for American and National League baseball
teams.10 The antitrust violations alleged in Piazza were based on
MLB's monopolization of this market and its attempt to exclude the
Tampa Bay investors from competing in this market. Professional
baseball's reserve clause and its exemption from antitrust laws in the
player restraint context presents a distinct and separate issue.
From this perspective, analysis of the Piazza court is easy to understand. In its discussion of the Supreme Court trilogy, the court identified two steps in what it characterized as the stripping from "Federal
Baseball and Toolson any precedential value those cases may have had
beyond the particular facts there involved, i.e., the reserve clause.""' °
The court first noted that Flood rejected the reasoning of Federal
Baseball and held professional baseball to be a business engaged in
interstate commerce.' °9 Noting that this determination "entirely undercut the precedential value of the reasoning of Federal Baseball,"
the Piazza court found that Flood then attempted to "justify the continued precedential value of the result of that decision."(emphasis
added)10 The court found the Supreme Court's awkward attempt to
rationalize the enduring precedential value of Federal Baseball to be
based on "continued positive congressional inaction and concerns
over retroactivity." '
The Piazza court then attempted to justify its decision limiting the
antitrust exemption to the specific facts presented in Federal Baseball,
that is, the reserve clause. Piazza rationalized its decision under the
principle of stare decisis and the distinction between rule stare decisis

105. ld. at 435-36.
106. Id. at 436-38.
107. Id. at 430.
108. Id. at 436.
109. Id.
110. Id.
I11. Id.
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and result stare decisis."2 Stare decisis, the court stated, involves the
principle that courts are bound to adhere to both the explication of
rules of law (the reasoning of the case), and the result of the case."'
With the reasoning of FederalBaseball eliminated when the Supreme
Court's found in Flood that professional baseball is a business engaged in interstate commerce, Piazza found that courts are only
bound by the result of Federal Baseball.14 Accordingly, the district
court said that stare decisis mandates that only the result of Federal
Baseball, not the reasoning and its applicable rule of law, continues to
have precedential value. Thus, the court reasoned that MLB's antitrust exemption is limited to the facts presented in FederalBaseball the exemption of the reserve clause.'
The final step of the court's analysis was to distinguish the Seventh
Circuit's contrary holding in Charles 0. Finley & Co., which it did on
three grounds. First, the court noted that neither Charles 0. Finley &
Co. nor any other decision had attempted such a thorough analysis of
the Supreme Court trilogy." 6 Second, the court noted that Charles 0.
Finley & Co. was persuasive, not mandatory authority, and would not
be followed."' Third, the court noted that antitrust exemptions are to
be narrowly construed and that the application of this principle is critical because the exemption "has been characterized by its own creator
as an 'anomaly' and an 'aberration." '1l8
IV.

LIMITING MLB's

ANTITRUST EXEMPTION

To

THE LABOR MARKET

The Piazza court, while continuing to abide by Supreme Court
precedent, has effectively reduced the MLB antitrust exemption to an
irrelevant status. Piazza successfully limited the exemption to professional baseball's reserve clause through the creative utilization of stare
decisis."9 By identifying the characteristics of legal opinions and the

112.

Id.at 437-38.

113.
114.

Id. at 438.
Id.

115.

Id. The court noted, however, that if the rule and reasoning of Federal Baseball were

applied, the issue of whether the MLB antitrust exemption immunized MLB in this case would

not be ripe. Id. at 441. The court would first have to determine that activities giving rise to the
alleged antitrust violation were central to the business of baseball, and thus, entitled to the ex-

emption. Id. at 440-41. This result is necessary because only activities central to professional
baseball are entitled to the exemption. See Postema v. Nat'l League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 799 F. Supp. 1475, 1489 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston
Sports Ass'n, Inc., 541 F. Supp. 263, 271 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (exemption does not extend to cover

broadcasting of baseball games).
116.
117.
118.
119.

Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 437.
Id.
Id. at 438.
See Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 438.
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reasoning behind stare decisis, the Piazza court's technique may be
identified and the decision's appropriateness recognized.
Piazza is premised upon a general understanding of the principles
underlying judicial decision making and stare decisis. The process of
judicial decision making may be characterized as a syllogism involving
three steps: first, the court must determine the applicable rule of law;
second, the court must ascertain the relevant facts; third, the court
reaches its decision by applying the applicable rule of law to the relevant facts. 20 The application of the rule of law to the facts to reach a
decision forms the court's rationes decidendi, or reasoning of the
case.' 2 1 Recognizing these three steps as an essential part of the judicial process is integral to understanding the effectiveness of the Piazza
court's decision.
The doctrine of stare decisis is susceptible to more than one interpretation. The orthodox interpretation of stare decisis means to "keep
to the rationes decidendi of past cases.' ' 2 2 The literal interpretation,
however, is "to stand by decisions."' 23 Piazza recognized that this difference in interpretation of the doctrine merely acknowledges that the
precedential binding effect of a decision actually consists of both rule
stare decisis and result stare decisis. 24
Rule stare decisis is the binding effect in precedent of the applicable
rule of law as part of the rationes decidendi.125 It is the court's adherence to a rule of law in order to acquire a just decision,1as and is
founded on the apparent predictability of judicial decisions.12 7 It is believed that the articulation and application of a rule of law as part of
the rationes decidendi "serves to increase the uniformity, deliberateness, correctness, impersonality, and objectivity of judicial decisions,
serving as a check on judicial arbitrariness and bias."' 12 The judicial
system fosters these values by adhering to the binding rules of law
established in prior decisions.
The second component of staredecisis consists of the result attained
in a particular case. Result stare decisis is the binding effect of a prior
court's decision irrespective of the rule of law used in the rationes de-

120. James Hardisty, Reflections On Stare Decisis, 55 IND. L.J. 41, 43 (1979).
121. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 691-92 (3rd Cir.
1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
122. Rupert Cross, Different Meanings of Stare Decisis, in THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: READINGS, MATERIALS AND CASES 787 (Ruggero J. Aldisert ed., 1976).
123. Hardisty, supra note 120, at41 n.4.
124. Id. at 52-53.
125. Id. at 53, 57.
126. Id. at53.
127. Id.at 55.
128. Id.
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cidendi. 29 Whether the court applied a pre-existing rule of law or created a new rule of law, result stare decisis simply compels adherence
to a prior decision's result. Precedence is characterized as "similarity
in results follows similarity in facts and a difference in results reflects
a difference in facts." 13 0 Thus, the American system of precedent is
based upon adherence to both the reasoning and result of a case. 3 '
The importance of recognizing that stare decisis compels the adherence to both the rationesdecidendi and the particular result of a case
is illustrated when considering its actual binding effect on subsequent
cases. When an appellate court is confronted with an issue, it may do
one of two things. The court may decide the case in accordance with
precedent, in which the court is said to have adhered to stare decisis;
or, the court may decide the case contrary to precedent, in which the
court is said to overrule the decision.' 32 Thus, the phrase "to overrule
a decision" may be seen as an antonym of stare decisis.13
However, a court may comply with stare decisis without overruling
precedent by distinguishing the present case on the basis of either the
rationesdecidendi or the result of the case. 134 This situation is present
when either the case to be decided presents facts that are materially
different from binding precedent or the deciding court reached its decision without considering the rule of law as part of the rationes decidendi of the precedent. 3 ' Thus, a court does not overrule precedent if
it merely distinguishes it upon rule stare decisis or result stare decisis.
Rather, the deciding court's decision is consistent with stare decisis if
it distinguishes precedent on either basis.
When these principles are applied to the situation presented in Piazza, it is easy to discern the propriety of the district court's decision.
First, one must identify the syllogism presented by the Supreme
Court's decision in FederalBaseball. The applicable rule of law is that
the monopolization of interstate commerce violates federal antitrust
laws.3 6 The relevant facts, as determined by the Supreme Court in
1922, are that professional baseball's reserve clause did not affect in-

129. Id. at 56.
130. Id.
131. In contrast, the English system of precedent places less reliance on the reasoning of a
case and merely relies on the specific result of a case. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa.
v. Casey, 947 F.2d at 692 (3rd Cir. 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
132. Hardisty, supra note 120, at 59.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.at61.
136. See Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v.Nat'l League Of Professional Baseball
Clubs, Inc., 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
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terstate commerce. 3 ' The Court reasoned that since baseball's effect
on interstate commerce was merely an incident to the game itself, it
was not engaged in interstate commerce. 3 ' Thus, the result is that professional baseball and its reserve clause are not subject to federal antitrust laws."
The Supreme Court has continued to adhere to this precedent for
over seventy years, but its underlying rationale was extracted in
Flood. Although the Supreme Court mandated continued adherence
to Federal Baseball, its determination that professional baseball constitutes interstate commerce severely limited its precedential effect.l40
Piazza recognized this limitation as deriving from the undermining of
the Supreme Court's rationes decidendi in FederalBaseball.4 I
By subverting the Supreme Court's reasoning, the Piazza court concluded that it was only compelled to adhere to the result of the Supreme Court trilogy, 142 and premised its decision upon result stare
decisis. It also distinguished the facts of Piazza from FederalBaseball.
FederalBaseball dealt with professional baseball's reserve system and
monopolization of the labor market in the player restraint context. 43
Piazza deals with the monopolization of the product market in the
context of restraining franchise mobility.'" Thus, Piazza adhered to
the principle of stare decisis and FederalBaseball while denying MLB
the use of the antitrust exemption.
The Piazza decision represents the natural evolution of a legal
anomaly that has persisted for over seventy years. Limiting the MLB
antitrust exemption to the player restraint context effectively diminishes the exemption's legal relevancy in modern labor disputes. Today, player restraint issues are focused upon free agency and are
adequately dealt with through collective bargaining agreements. 4 The
legal relevancy of the exemption is further reduced due to the labor
exemption provided to the labor market issues dealt with through collective bargaining agreements. Thus, Piazza merely provides a recog-

137. Id. at 209.
138. Id. at 208-09.
139. This is the exact conclusion reached by the Supreme Court trilogy. See Federal Baseball
Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. Nat'l League Of Professional Baseball Clubs, Inc., 259 U.S. 200
(1922); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258,
282 (1972).
140. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282.
141. Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 436 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
142. !d. at 438.
143. See Nat'l League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore,
Inc., 269 F. 681, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1920), aff'd, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
144. Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 422-23. See also text accompanying notes 1-9.
145. See text accompanying notes 57-86.
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nizable death to a legal anomaly that has essentially already perished.
Piazza is important for its effect on antitrust violations in the product market and franchise mobility context rather than on the labor
market and player restraint context. Although the exemption has
practically no utility in modern labor disputes, it remains potentially
applicable to the product market.'" Piazza in effect nullifies this potential by limiting the exemption to the labor market and the player
restraint context. This limitation is conceivable in light of the Supreme
Court's undermining of the rationale in FederalBaseball and the continuing accession of the resolution of labor disputes through collective
bargaining.
The Piazza decision can also be justified upon the principles of fundamental fairness and accountability. Without passing judgment on
the allegations presented by the Tampa Bay investment group concerning MLB's disapproval process, MLB simply cannot enjoy a
status of total legal immunity. Certainly it was not the Supreme
Court's intention in 1922, or Congress's intention later through its inaction, to grant MLB broad exemption from all potential liability. Although the exemption is limited to activities closely related to the
business of professional baseball,1 47 further limiting the exemption to
monopolization of the labor market in the player restraint context
simply makes sense.
Even if the Supreme Court contemplated holding MLB exempt
from activities that restrain interstate commerce in the product market
context in Federal Baseball, Justice Holmes noted the potential for
professional baseball to evolve into the mass conglomerate involved in
interstate commerce that it represents today. By recognizing this potential, the Supreme Court left open the possibility that baseball
would one day engage in interstate commerce and be subject to federal antitrust laws.'4
Professional baseball does engage in interstate commerce; that dispute no longer exists.' 49 However, both the Supreme Court and Congress have been unwilling to overrule Federal Baseball. Thus, faced
with congressional passivity and the Supreme Court mandate to fol-

146.

However, the restraint on the product market would have to be "central enough to

baseball to be encompassed in the baseball exemption." Postema v. Nat'l League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 799 F. Supp. 1475, 1489 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (quoting Henderson Broadcast-

ing Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n, 541 F. Supp. 263, 265 (S.D.Tex. 1982)).
147.

Id.

148. See Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 360-61 (1953) (citing Hart v.
B.F. Keith Vaudeville Exchange, 262 U.S. 271, 274 (1923)).
149.

See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972).
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low precedent, the Piazza court merely interpreted Federal Baseball's
precedential effect to conform with prevailing social conditions.
Accordingly, the district court's decision in Piazza appropriately
construed the parameters of the MLB antitrust exemption as being restricted to the facts presented in FederalBaseball. The exemption was
originally intended to exempt professional baseball's reserve system,
not to provide MLB with blanket immunity. Identifying and distinguishing between the market for professional baseball players' services
and the market for professional baseball itself helps rationalize the
exemption's continuing vitality. The exemption was intended to provide MLB immunity from monopolizing the labor market and should
not be applicable today to the monopolization of the product market.
In Tampa Bay's scenario, it is alleged that MLB has monopolized the
product market by preventing the Tampa Bay investment group from
competitively bidding for a professional baseball team.
The legitimacy of Piazza also is strengthened by recent congressional activity. Two bills are currently pending before Congress that
would completely abrogate the MLB antitrust exemption. A bill introduced in the Senate Committee on the Judiciary proposes specific reversal of the Supreme Court trilogy creating and reaffirming the
exemption, and the addition of a provision to the Clayton Antitrust
Act declaring the applicability of federal antitrust laws to professional
baseball. 50 A similar bill introduced in the House Committee on the

150.

S. 500, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) provides:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE

This Act may be cited as the "Professional Baseball Antitrust Reform Act of
1993".

SECTION 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds that(1) the business of organized professional baseball is in, or affects, interstate commerce; and
(2) the antitrust laws should be amended to reverse the result of the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Federal Baseball Club v. Nat'l League, 259
U.S. 200 (1922), Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953), and Flood
v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), which exempted baseball from coverage under the antitrust laws.
SECTION 3. APPLICATION
BASEBALL.

OF ANTITRUST LAWS

TO PROFESSIONAL

The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end of the
following section:
"SEC. 27. Except as provided in Public Law 87-331 (15 U.S.C. 291 et seq.) (commonly know as the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961), the antitrust laws shall apply to
the business of organized professional baseball."
SECTION 4. EFFECTIVE DATE.

The provisions and amendments made by this Act shall take effect one year after
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Judiciary proposes the same result, but without the explicit reversal of
the Supreme Court trilogy and the amendment to the Clayton Antitrust Act.Il

The pendency of these bills makes it apparent that even Congress
finds troubling the potential misuse of monopoly power as alleged in
the Tampa Bay case. Professional baseball may hold a special place in
the hearts of Americans, but the MLB antitrust exemption was enacted to ensure the integrity of the game at a time when it was subject
to dishonor. This same act of homage cannot now be manipulated to
absolve America's pastime of the very actions that potentially defy
that integrity.
V.

CONCLUSION

In 1922, the Supreme Court declared professional baseball to be intrastate commerce and thus exempt from federal antitrust laws. For
over seventy years, the MLB antitrust exemption has persisted as a
unique legal anomaly. The Supreme Court has justified its refusal to
abrogate the exemption on the basis of stare decisis and congressional
inactivity. However, the scope of the exemption has recently been
called into question with the Supreme Court's determination that professional baseball is indeed engaged in interstate commerce.

The federal district court in Piazza is the first court to redefine the
exemption's parameters. Piazza recognizes the exemption's limited
utility in labor market disputes and its potential unjust applicability in
the date of the enactment of this Act and(1) shall apply to conduct that occurs and any agreement in effect after such effective date; and
(2) shall not apply to conduct that occurred before such effective date.
151. H.R. 108, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) provides:
SECTION 1. FINDING
The Congress finds that the business of providing for profit public baseball games
between teams of professional baseball players in a league and between such teams of
rival leagues is in, or affects, interstate commerce.
SECTION 2. APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL
BASEBALL.
The antitrust laws shall apply to the business of providing for profit public baseball
games between teams of professional baseball players and to leagues composed of
teams of professional baseball players.
SECTION 3. DEFINITION.
For purposes of this Act, the term "antitrust laws" has the meaning given it in
subsection (a) of the first section of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12(a), except that such
term includes section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45) to the
extent that such section 5 relates to unfair methods of competition.
SECTION 4. APPLICATION OF SECTION 2.
Section 2 shall not apply with respect to conduct occurring before the date of the enactment of
this Act.
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the product market context. As a result, the district court restricted
the exemption to professional baseball's reserve system as contemplated by the Supreme Court in FederalBaseball. Hence, Piazza successfully restricted the MLB antitrust exemption while adhering to
binding Supreme Court precedent and the principle of stare decisis.
The decision-making process utilized by MLB to disapprove of
Tampa Bay's effort to purchase and relocate the San Francisco Giants
presents several potential antitrust violations that have disturbed legislators as well as sports fans. These violations are directed at MLB's
apparent monopolization of the market for professional baseball. The
appropriateness of Piazza is apparent when one considers the fact that
the exemption was originally intended to exempt professional baseball's monopolization of the labor market through its standard contract reserve clause. The present utility of the labor market exemption
in the player restraint context is minimal due to the advent of collective bargaining. Accordingly, Piazza represents a restrictive judicial
interpretation of a legal anomaly that should have been abrogated
years ago, and whose utility has long since subsided.

